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SEcuRmES ARBITRATION
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals selected divergent'approaches to the
two securities arbitration cases it heard during the Survey period. In the first
case, Armijo v. Prudential,' the Tenth Circuit mandated arbitration of an em-
ployment discrimination suit pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the
brokers' employment agreements Adhering to the national presumption fa-
voring arbitration, the court declared that when it finds ambiguity in an arbi-
tration agreement it must assume the parties intended to arbitrate any dispute
that may arise unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.3
Alternatively, in Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch,' the Tenth Circuit held that
courts, and not arbitrators, are to decide jurisdictional issues of arbitrability in
the securities industry.' The court reasoned that where there is ambiguity in
an arbitration contract as to whom the parties intended to resolve timeliness
disputes, the courts shall have the responsibility of determining whether a
claim is time-barred. In Cogswell, the court followed Supreme Court prece-
dent' reversing the traditional presumption in favor of arbitration where the
question is one involving jurisdictional issues of arbitrability
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITrIES INDUSTRY
In 1817, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) first introduced arbitra-
tion into the securities industry.' The NYSE adopted arbitration to offer its
members an inexpensive and efficient forum in which to resolve their dis-
putes.9 By 1872, the NYSE made arbitration available to nonmembers, includ-
ing securities industry employees and investors.'0 Nevertheless, American
courts infrequently employed and, indeed, discouraged arbitration." The
1. 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
2. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 799.
3. ld.
4. 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996).
5. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 480.
6. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995) (holding that courts,
and not arbitrators, should independently determine arbitrability of securities disputes where there
is a relevant arbitration provision).
7. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 478.
8. Catherine McGuire et al., Current Issues in Securities Industry Arbitration, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY, Jan. 11, 1996, at 45, 47.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Brian K. Van Engen, Post-Gilmer Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The Eapan-
sion of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort to Reverse the
Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391, 393 (1996). Much of the judicial hostility towards arbitration descend-
ed from the English judicial system's disapproval of arbitration. Id. For additional historical back-
ground, see generally C. EDWARD FLErcHER, ARBrrRATING SEcuRims DISPUrES 15 (1990) (dis-
cussing how English courts permitted revocation of arbitration agreements because the difficulties
505
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American legal system's reluctance to invoke this new type of dispute resolu-
tion stemmed from the belief that it was an unfair and arbitrary process. 2
In response to the judicial hostility toward alternative forms of dispute
resolution, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925.3 In
so doing, Congress sought to "place arbitration agreements on equal ground
with other, more accepted contractual arrangements" and to displace judicial
preference for litigation.' 4 The FAA states that "[i]f any suit or proceeding
[is] brought... upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agree-
ment..., the court ... shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial
of the action until such arbitration has been had .... ", Sixty years later,
the Supreme Court declared that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitra-
ble issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration....
With the adoption of the FAA, and as the number of investors in the
marketplace swelled, arbitration became both more essential and more preva-
lent. In 1958, the NYSE mandated that all employees arbitrate disputes with
investors. 7 Likewise, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
a self-regulatory organization of the securities industry, adopted arbitration
proceedings in 1968."8 Initially, the NASD instituted arbitration as a volun-
tary measure for NASD members and customers. 9 However, by 1972, the
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure (NASD Code or Code) required mem-
bers to submit disputes to arbitration upon a customer's insistence.2'
Today, the NASD arbitrates approximately 6,000 disputes per year, com-
pared with only 318 in 1980.2" These numbers reflect the sweeping effect
arbitration has had on the securities industry in the last decade alone. The
FAA, together with several recent Supreme Court decisions, can be credited
for the emergence of arbitration as an effective and widely employed alterna-
tive to litigation.'
of enforcement would destroy their jurisdiction); Darrell Hall, An Argument Against Permitting
Parties to Opt Out of U.S. Securities Laws in International Transactions, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 57,
61 (1997) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court was "initially disinclined to honor" arbitration
agreements in the securities context).
12. Paul Lansing & John D. Bailey, The Future of Punitive Damage Awards in Securities
Arbitration Cases After Mastrobuono, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 201, 202 (1996).
13. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14,(1994); Van Engen, supra note 11, at 393.
14. Id.
15. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
16. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
17. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 47.
18. Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the Future Hold?,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 185 (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Marilyn Blumberg Cane et al., Securities Arbitration Update 1995, in ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY, Feb. 16, 1996, at 529, 531; Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration-Recent
Issues, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Jan. 12, 1995, at 205, 207.
22. Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea
Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 1 (1996). See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); AT&T Tech. v. Communication




II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
A. Background
Regulatory organizations requires all securities industry employees to sign
a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer
(Form U-4) upon employment." The Form U-4 is, inter alia, a private agree-
ment between the employee and employer to arbitrate any dispute that may
arise between them.14 The scope of arbitrable controversies is usually gov-
erned by reference to either NYSE or NASD rules.'
In a seminal securities employment arbitration case, Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.,6 the Supreme Court held that a claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) can be subject to compulsory
arbitration.' The Gilmer court noted that since the plaintiff had agreed to
arbitrate any disputes subject to NYSE rules by signing a Form U-4, arbitra-
tion must proceed.2" In short, Gilmer holds that statutory claims, such as
those under the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, may be subject
to mandatory arbitration.'
While the majority of circuits follow Gilmer with regard to NYSE age
discrimination disputes, they remain split over whether types of employment
controversies mandate arbitration pursuant to NASD rules.30 For example, in
Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood,3 the Seventh Circuit held that an arbitra-
tion clause in a Form U-4 was not enforceable. 2 Although the Form U-4 ref-
erenced the NASD Code with regard to the scope of arbitrable issues, the
23. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 65; IAN R. MACNEIL E" AL., FEDERAL ARBrIRATIoN
LAw § 13.3.3 (1994). Securities firms use Form U-4 agreements to register their securities indus-
try personnel with a particular regulatory organization, such as the NYSE or NASD. McGuire et
al., supra note 8, at 65.
24. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 65.
25. Id. at 65-66 (providing examples of NYSE and NASD arbitration procedure clauses that
define the scope of arbitrable issues pursuant to the policies of such self-regulatory organizations).
26. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See Lisa M. Horvath, Arbitration, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 637, 639
(1996) ("In Gilmer, pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a broker's representative appli-
cation, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) was subject to mandatory arbitration" and "[al broad reading of Gilmer permits arbi-
tration of any statutory claim when an employment contract contains an arbitration agreement")
(citations omitted).
27. Giimer, 500 U.S. at 20.
28. Id. at 26 (stating that "having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself has evidenced an intention to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue" (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). The Court concluded that Gilmer failed to show that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration with the adoption of the ADEA. Id. at 30-31.
29. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 402. See also Hayford, supra note 22, at 29-32 (stating
that Gilmer "stands as an unmistakable indicant of the breadth and depth of the current [Supreme]
Court's changed attitude about the suitability of arbitration as a means for adjudicating statutory
claims'). Id. at 32.
30. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 408.
31. 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993). In Farrand, the court did not interpret the NASD Code
to mandate arbitration, primarily because neither the NASD nor the SEC had issued an analysis of
the Code requiring arbitration. Id. at 1255.
32. Id.
1997]
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court did not read employment discrimination disputes into the NASD
Code." In Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,3' however, the Elev-
enth Circuit declared that the NASD Code mandates arbitration of all employ-
ee discrimination suits." As in Armijo, discussed below, the Kidd court relied
upon the concept that ambiguities in arbitration clauses must invariably be set-
tled in favor of arbitrability.
36
B. Armijo v. Prudential Insurance Company of America"
1. Facts
Plaintiffs Armijo, Fuentes and Hourigan were Prudential employees sell-
ing insurance policies and mutual funds.' The plaintiffs, all of whom are
Hispanic, filed employment discrimination complaints against defendant Pru-
dential with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging termina-
tion as the result of race, sex or national origin." The plaintiffs subsequently
filed their employment discrimination suits in federal court.' Prudential re-
sponded by filing motions to compel arbitration pursuant to plaintiffs' signed
employment agreements."'
As a condition of their employment, the plaintiffs signed a Form U-4.'2
The Form U-4 compelled the plaintiffs to arbitrate certain disputes that might
arise between the plaintiffs and Prudential.43 According to the Form U-4, the
scope of arbitrable disputes is governed by the organizations with which Pru-
dential and its employees are registered." In this instance, Prudential required
all of its employees engaged in the selling of securities to register with the
NASD.45 Thus, the provisions of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
were integrated into the Form U-4 and bound the plaintiffs and Prudential."
The NASD Code provides that "any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out
of or in connection with the business of any member of the [NASD] Associ-
ation" shall be arbitrated at the insistence of any member.'
33. Id.
34. 32 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1994). In Kidd, two securities employees alleged violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against their employer. After the district court refused to
compel arbitration, the plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit which summarily reversed the
district court's ruling, requiring arbitration. Id. at 518-19. The Kidd court concluded that its inter-
pretation of NASD rules harmonized several of the Code's facially ambiguous sections. ld. at 519-
20.
35. Id. at 519.
36. Id
37. 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
38. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 795.
39. Id. at 796 (stating that plaintiffs filed prior to October 1, 1993, the date of the amended
NASD Code). See infra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the between the amended and
unamended versions of the NASD Code).
40. Id. (stating that plaintiffs filed complaints in federal court after October 1, 1993).
41. Id.




46. Id. The Form U-4 signed by all three plaintiffs incorporated the February 1992 version
of the Code. Id. at 796.
47. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 1 (1992). On October 1, 1993, the NASD
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The District Court of New Mexico granted Prudential's motions to compel
arbitration with Hourigan and Armijo.' A different judge of the same district
court, however, denied the motion with regard to Fuentes." Accordingly,
each of the losing parties appealed to the Tenth Circuit."'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit granted Prudential's motions to compel arbitration,
holding that all plaintiffs must submit their claims against Prudential to arbi-
tration.52 The arbitration provisions of the Form U-4 and the NASD Code
were upheld and considered germane to these plaintiffs." Moreover, the court
held that although the NASD amended its Code on October 1, 1993, to clarify
that some employment disputes are subject to arbitration,5 4 "[tihe version of
the Code in effect during the alleged acts of discrimination was the February
1992 version of the Code.""
Thus, the court focused the majority of its opinion on the issue of whether
the unamended version of the Code encompassed employment discrimination
suits. The court stated that the February 1992 NASD Code is vague with re-
spect to the types of disputes it covers.' Accordingly, the court relied upon
both precedent and policy to justify its conclusion that the NASD Code covers
employment discrimination suits."
First, the court adhered to a judicial presumption in favor of arbitration to
support its opinion.' The court stated that the "general mandate that is driv-
ing our decision in this case [is] the requirement to construe arbitration clauses
broadly where possible." 9 Moreover, where there is ambiguity in arbitration
amended its Code of Arbitration Procedure. The amended version of the Code covers, inter alia,
"any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any mem-
ber of the Association, or arising out of the employment or termination of employment of associ-
ated person(s) with any member .... NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 1 (1993) (empha-
sis added to denote language added to the amended version of the Code).
48. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 795-96.
49. Id. at 796. Initially, the district court denied Prudential's motions to compel arbitration
with regard to all three plaintiffs. Id. However, upon Prudential's motion for rehearing and its
submission to the court of the October 1, 1993 Code amendments, the district court reversed its
order concerning Hourigan and Armijo. Id.
50. Id. at 795. This judge came to the opposite conclusion although presented with the
amended Code as well. Id. at 796.
51. Id. at 796. Because "[t]hese cases were assigned to the same panel, orally argued togeth-
er with one counsel representing all Plaintiffs and another representing all Defendants, and involve
the same legal issues," the Tenth Circuit consolidated the cases. Id. at 795, n. 1.
52. Id. at 798-801.
53. 1d. at 795 (considering the plaintiffs "associate members").
54. Id. at 798.
55. Id. at 796.
56. Id. at 798 (stating that "[u]nfortunately, the February 1992 Code is less than clear re-
garding its applicability to employment disputes").
57. Id. at 797-99. For instance, the court stated that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that an
employee can be required to arbitrate federal claims for employment discrimination if he or she
has contracted to do so." Id. at 797 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35).
58. d. at 798.
59. Id. at 799. For opinions holding that the NASD Code applies to employment disputes,
see Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 32 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1994) and Johnson v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995).
19971
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clauses, the court need not look further.' "mo acknowledge the ambiguity is
to resolve the issue, because all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of
arbitrability.9'6
Second, the court acknowledged that an employee may be required to
submit an employment discrimination suit to arbitration if a contract calling
for arbitration exists.' Indeed, an examination of the broad language of the
Form U-4 and NASD Code indicates that plaintiffs and Prudential intended to
arbitrate numerous potential disputes, most likely including employment con-
troversies.'
Last, the court gave deference to the fact that, according to NASD legis-
lative comment, the amended version of the NASD Code" was implemented
"simply to 'clear up any ambiguity' and 'to assure' that employment disputes
are arbitrable under Section 8 [of the Code]." Thus, the most appropriate
outcome incorporates employment discrimination suits within the meaning of
previous Codes, such as the February 1992 version of the NASD Code.'
Consequently, the court concluded that each plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate
any dispute with Prudential encompassed within the NASD Code, including al-
leged employment discrimination.'
B. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Armijo is consistent with that of the Su-
preme Court and the majority of other circuits in mandating arbitration of
employment disputes in the securities industry. Armijo once and for all sets
forth the Tenth Circuit's position concerning the treatment of employment
discrimination suits in the securities industry. Where the court discovers ambi-
guity in an arbitration agreement as to whether the parties intended to arbitrate
a particular dispute, the court shall mandate arbitration unless their is clear and
60. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 798.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 797 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35).
63. Id at 799. Speaking for the court, Judge Ebel construed the Form U-4 agreement be-
tween the plaintiffs and Prudential broadly, stating that the language of the Form U-4 and, by
specific reference, the NASD Code "clearly indicates that the parties believed, and intended, that
at least certain disputes between Prudential and these Plaintiffs would be arbitrated." I Further-
more, the court stated that the Form U-4 signed by Prudential and the plaintiffs requires submis-
sion to arbitration of any disputes between the parties in connection with their employment rela-
tionship. Id. (referring to NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 8(a) (1993)).
64. Referring to the October 1, 1993 version of the NASD Code signed by Armijo and
Hourigan. Id.
65. Ld. at 800-01 (quoting 58 Fed. Reg. 39,070, 39,071 (1993)).
66. Id at 798. The court stated that there is evidence from as early as 1987 indicating that
the NASD Code applies to employment disputes. Id. (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 9232 (1987)). Several
other courts have applied the new NASD Code to employment controversies that occurred prior to
October 1, 1993, but filed after that date. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316 (9th
Cir. 1996) (discussed infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text); Pitter v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,
906 F. Supp 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (ordering arbitration of a Title VII claim although the relevant
conduct occurred prior to October 1, 1993); Wojcik v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 901 F. Supp. 1282
(N.D. 11I. 1995) (ordering arbitration of state fraud and contract claims where the alleged wrong-
doing took place before October 1, 1993).
67. Id. at 799.
[Vol. 74:2
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convincing evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, with this decision, the Tenth Circuit aligned itself with three
emerging trends in case law dealing with mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts.' The Tenth Circuit now advances the expansion of
the number of statutory claims subject to mandatory arbitration,' the creation
of a presumption of mandatory arbitrability of employment contracts:' and,
finally, the broad applicability of the FAA to "all but a small class of employ-
ment contracts."7'
C. Other Circuits
In Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co.,' the Ninth Circuit held that an employ-
ee who signed a Form U-4 agreement prior to October 1, 1993, and who al-
leges misconduct prior to that date, must arbitrate her wrongful discharge
suit.73 According to the court, because the amended version of the NASD
Code does not deprive the plaintiff of her substantive rights, and because the
plaintiff sued after the Code was amended, the arbitration rule controlled.74
More significantly, the court emphasized that the plaintiff signed a Form U-4
in which she agreed to be bound by NASD rules "as may be amended from
time to time."' Additionally, where a new procedural rule is adopted it shall
68. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 410 (referring to "the post-Gilmer trend toward expansive
enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses").
69. 1l at 407-08. See Horvath, supra note 26, at 639 (concluding that Gilmer "opened the
door to mandated arbitration of statutory claims"); see generally Metz v. Merrill Lynch, 39 F.3d
1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that an employee must arbitrate her Title VII claim pursuant
to her broker registration with the NASD); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932,
935 (9th Cir. 1992) (mandating arbitration where the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence
to prove that the language of Title VII precludes arbitration); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris,
Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1992) (mandating arbitration of claims pursuant to the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700
(11th Cir. 1992) (ordering arbitration based upon Gilmer and holding that there is "no reason to
distinguish between ADEA claims and Title VII claims" for the purposes of arbitration applicabili-
ty). But see Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that nei-
ther the legislative history nor the explicit language of Title VII require arbitration without a prior
judicia hearing).
70. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 408-10. See generally Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (stating that "[tihe Arbitration Act establishes that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration"); Kidd, 32 F.3d at 519 (declining to adopt either the Farrand decision or its
reasoning and mandating arbitration of all employee discrimination suits subject to the NASD
Code). But see Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that Gilmer
"did not establish a grand presumption in favor of arbitration" for employment contracts).
71. Van Engen, supra note 11, at 409-10 (declaring that "in keeping with the post-Gilmer
trend," several federal courts have endorsed the exclusion of only a limited number of employ-
ment contracts from FAA coverage). See also Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp.
1232, 1242 (D.NJ. 1994); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (N.D.
111. 1993). But see Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the "Alternative" Out of the Dispute Resolu-
tion of Title VII Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration
Agreements Arising Out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REv. 435, 446 (1994) (suggesting
that Congress' intent in drafting the FAA was to exempt employment contracts from the scope of
the act's jurisdiction).
72. 84 F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 1996).
73. Kuehner, 84 F.3d at 320-21.
74. Id
75. Id. at 320. Fuentes signed a Form U-4 identical to the one signed by the plaintiff in
1997]
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"govern suits filed after its effective date regardless of when the relevant con-
duct occurred." 6 Thus, although otherwise consistent with the Tenth Circuit's
ultimate decision in Armijo, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kuehner failed to
consider the presumption of arbitrability in upholding the mandatory arbitra-
tion clause.
III. THE TIMELINESS OF A CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION
A. Background
Self-regulatory organizations, including the NASD and the NYSE, insti-
tuted a rule imposing a six-year time limitation upon disputes eligible for
resolution through arbitration." "The purpose of the rule was to eliminate
from arbitration stale claims and to direct parties either to other arbitration
fora that may be available to them by contract or to the courts.""8 Until 1990,
this eligibility rule was free from controversy.' Since then, however, the pro-
cedural application of the rule has spawned extensive litigation.' Specifically,
because the eligibility requirement precludes claims from arbitration that are
filed more than six years from the occurrence of the transaction, whether the
courts or the arbitrators should decide the eligibility of a claim is uncertain."'
Interestingly, the circuit courts are split as to who should determine
whether arbitrators have jurisdiction to hear disputes where the controversy
arose more than six years prior to the filing. The Third,' Sixth,83 Seventh8
and Eleventh' Circuits have held that courts are to decide issues of timeli-
ness while the Fifth' and Eighth' Circuits maintain that arbitrators should
determine such issues." All of the circuits except the Eighth have based their
Kuehner. Armijo, 72 F.3d at 796.
76. Kuehner, 84 F.3d at 320 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. CL 1483, 1502
(1994)).
77. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 52.
78. Id at 52-53.
79. 1d. at 53.
80. 1d. See e.g., infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
81. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 53.
82. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993).
83. Securities Serv. Network, Inc. v. Cromwell, 62 F.3d 1418 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
decision) (holding that NASD Code § 35 does not satisfy the requirement that there be clear and
unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to allow the arbitrator to decide issues of timeliness);
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993); Roney & Co. v. Kassab, 981
F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992).
84. Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1992); PaineWebber,
Inc. v. Famam, 870 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989).
85. Merrill Lynch v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 383 (11th Cir. 1995).
86. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
issues of "substantive arbitrability" are for the courts to decide and that issues of "procedural
arbitrability" are for the arbitrators to determine).
87. FSC Secs. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that NASD
Code § 35 presented "clear and unmistakable" evidence of the parties' intent to arbitrate issues of
timeliness).
88. The Second and Ninth Circuits have not yet decided the narrow of issue of whether
courts or arbitrators are to decide issues of timeliness with regard to the NASD Code, but see
infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text. However, prior to the Survey period both the Second
and Ninth Circuits held that arbitrators are to decide statute of limitation issues. See Shearson
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decisions upon the principle that section 15 of the NASD Code "is either a
jurisdictional prerequisite or a procedural requirement" as opposed to evidence
of the parties contractual intent to arbitrate disputes."
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of who should decide
whether an arbitration claim is time barred. In First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan," the Court held that courts, and not arbitrators, should inde-
pendently determine if an arbitration panel has jurisdiction to hear a dispute.9'
The Court qualified this power by stating that courts will not have jurisdiction
where there is "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties intended
arbitrators to hear procedural issues such as timeliness.'
B. Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.93
1. Facts
The plaintiff, Cogswell, a Colorado resident, lost a significant amount of
money after investing in limited partnerships through her broker, Trevor, of
Merrill Lynch.94 The final transaction involved in this dispute took place on
February 23, 1987." When the plaintiff opened her account with Merrill
Lynch, she signed a client contract in which she agreed to arbitrate any dis-
pute arising from her business relationship with Merrill Lynch.'
In August, 1993, more than six years after the final transaction, the plain-
tiff filed an arbitration proceeding with the NASD against both Merrill Lynch
and Trevor.' The plaintiff alleged that her broker made unsuitable invest-
ments considering her financial objectives." Merrill Lynch petitioned the Su-
preme Court of New York for an order staying arbitration." Merrill Lynch
contended that the plaintiff's claim was ineligible for arbitration because she
filed her claim more than six years after the alleged misconduct." Specifi-
cally, Merrill Lynch referred to section 15 of the NASD Code which provides
that "[n]o dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to
Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 1991); O'Neel v. National Ass'n of
Secs. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1982); Application of Conticommodity Servs., Inc.
v. Philipp & Lion 1980, 613 F.2d 1222, 1226 (2d Cir. 1980).
89. Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration-Recent Developments, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY, Jan. 11, 1996, at 141, 146.
90. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
91. First Options, 115 S. Ct. at 1923-24.
92. d. at 1924.
93. 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cit. 1996).
94. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 475.
95. Id.
96. Id. The plaintiff opened her Merrill Lynch brokerage account in December 1984. Id.
97. Id.
98. 1& Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the investments "were of high risk and would
not be liquid for many years into the future" and that "Trevor earned substantial commissions by
purchasing these investments for [her] account, substantially in excess of the amount he would
have earned if he had purchased suitable securities for her account." Id. (alterations in original).
99. Id. Merrill Lynch appealed to the New York court system because its agreement with the




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the occur-
rence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or controversy."''
°
In the meantime, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order to compel arbi-
tration in the District Court of Colorado."° The district court stayed its pro-
ceeding pending the outcome of the New York petition. 3
Because the plaintiff failed to show cause why the petition should be
denied, the New York Supreme Court granted Merrill Lynch's petition, hold-
ing that the claim was time-barred according to section 15 of the NASD
Code."° Consequently, Merrill Lynch applied to the District Court of Colo-
rado for an order permanently staying arbitration based on the New York
Supreme Court's ruling." The District Court of Colorado denied Merrill
Lynch's motion and ordered arbitration to proceed."m The district court rea-
soned that "only arbitrators, and not the courts, have jurisdiction to determine
whether [section] 15 of the NASD Code bars an arbitration claim."'" Merrill
Lynch appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
2. Decision
The issue before the Tenth Circuit in Cogswell was one of first impres-
sion, °" and its decision affiliated the Tenth Circuit with the majority of other
circuits."' The Tenth Circuit held that courts, and not arbitrators, must inde-
pendently determine the timeliness of an arbitration claim under the NASD
unless there exists "clear and unmistakable" evidence to the contrary."'
The Cogswell court based much of its decision on First Options."2 The
First Options court declared that the intentions of the parties must be discov-
ered to determine whether they meant for an arbitrator or a court to decide the
timeliness of a claim."3 But, "[c]ourts should not assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]'
evidence that they did so."" 4 Thus, First Options' analysis reversed the tra-
ditional presumption that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
arbitrability. Rather, the Court declared that once the language of the contract
is determined to be unclear regarding who is to decide arbitrability, the courts






107. Id. at 475-76 (relying upon the Eighth Circuit's ruling in FSC Secs. Corp., 14 F.3d at
1310).
108. Id. at 476.
109. Id. (stating that "[w]e have never considered whether the district courts have jurisdiction
to determine whether an arbitration claim is barred under the time limit contained in § 15 of the
NASD Code").
110. Id. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
111. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 480 (quoting First Options, 115 S. Ct. at 1924).
112. Id.




should automatically settle the issue.'
In Cogswell, the Tenth Circuit decided that in order to determine the
parties' intentions concerning who is to decide arbitrability, the court must
examine the language of the contract."6 Here, the court held that it need not
determine whether section 15 of the NASD Code is silent or ambiguous as to
whether the courts or the arbitrators should assess timeliness.' ' 7 Instead, it
was obliged only to conclude that section 15 cannot be considered "clear and
unmistakable" evidence that the parties intended to have arbitrators decide
issues of timeliness."8 As a result, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling and remanded the case for a determination as to whether there is
sufficient evidence that the plaintiff's claim is in fact time-barred." 9
C. Analysis
Cogswell represents a significant and controversial step for the Tenth
Circuit. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Cogswell effectively establishes a
statute of limitations for the commencement of arbitration proceedings. The
six-year time period to resolve disputes in arbitration is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to reaching an arbitral tribunal."2 Thus, where six years have alleg-
edly elapsed since the occurrence of the event giving rise to the cause of ac-
tion, the courts are compelled to determine whether the claim is in fact time-
barred.'
12
Such a rule will have the effect of adding an additional stage to any arbi-
tration proceeding where a party claims arbitration is time-barred. Trial courts
will have to make in-depth, factual determinations if they are delegated the
responsibility of resolving issues of timeliness."n These elaborate proceed-
115. Id. at 1924-25.
116. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 478 (stating that "[ilf we conclude the agreement is silent, ambigu-
ous, or devoid of 'clear and unmistakable' evidence the parties intended the arbitrators to deter-
mine the applicability of § 15 of the NASD Code, we must conclude the parties intended for the
court to decide whether it applies" (citing First Options, 115 S. CL at 1924)).
117. Id. at 480.
118. Id. at 480-81. The court also analyzed § 35 of the NASD Code which provides that "ar-
bitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under
the Code." Id. (quoting NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 35 (1995)). However, as with §
15 of the NASD Code, the court held that § 35 does not offer "clear and unmistakable" evidence
that the parties sought to have the arbitrators decide whether a claim is time-barred. Id.
119. Id. at 481.
120. Cane et al., supra note 21, at 557-58. Moreover, the effect of this rule is considered by
at least one commentator to deprive the investor of a substantive right:
The rule has been interpreted by the securities industry and by the judiciary to bar an
investor from bringing, in either an arbitral or judicial forum, a claim, otherwise timely
pursuant to the statute of limitations when, pursuant to the eligibility rule, six years have
elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim.
Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of the Eligibility Rule in Securities Arbitration: The
Further Aggravation of Unequal Bargaining Power, 46 DEPAuL L. REV. 109, 140 (1996).
121. Cane et al., supra note 21, at 558.
122. In fact, the plaintiff raised the point that a jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitration will
require courts to hold "mini-trials" in order to resolve such factual disputes. Although the court
conceded that "[t]his may indeed occur in some cases," it ultimately dismissed such a concern for
convenience in favor of upholding the parties' contractual agreement in the absence of clear and
unmistakable evidence to the contrary. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 481; see also Merrill Lynch v. Cohen,
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ings will undermine the purposes of the NASD arbitration clauses, originally
installed to offer an efficient and inexpensive alternative to litigation.'"
D. Other Circuits
Two similar cases were decided by the other circuits during the Survey
period. In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi,'24 the First Circuit held that arbitra-
tors, and not the courts, are to decide issues of timeliness.' 2 In Elahi, the
court stated that the rule governing their decision, as set forth in First Op-
tions, !26 presumptively requires resolution of arbitrability issues by the
courts.'" Thus, the Elahi court's decision turned on whether the court classi-
fied the dispute as an issue of arbitrability. Because the court considered the
language of the agreement ambiguous at best, and supported the longstanding
tradition that ambiguity in arbitration agreements shall presumptively be de-
cided in favor of arbitration, it held that the timeliness of the claim must be
submitted to the discretion of an arbitrator.'"
In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk,' 29 the Second Circuit followed its earlier
decisions in Application of Conticommodity Services, Inc.'" and Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner.'3 ' In both Conticommodity and Wagoner,
the court was faced with the broader issue of who is to decide whether a dis-
pute is barred when the statute of limitations has tolled.'"2 In Bybyk, howev-
er, the court addressed for the first time the narrower issue of the arbitrability
of a claim that may be time-barred under specific eligibility requirements of
the arbitration contract itself.'33 After examining the intent of the parties
62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that "§ 15 is a substantive eligibility requirement" and the
courts should decide issues of timeliness of arbitration claims because "concerns for judicial econ-
omy alone are not sufficient to justify interference with the binding agreement of the parties")
(quoting Goldberg v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 912 F.2d 1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1990)).
123. Masucci, supra note 18, at 185 (stating that "[t]he objective of [SRO arbitration clauses]
was to provide the small investor with a fast, fair, and inexpensive mechanism to resolve disputes
with the securities industry"); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTERBROOK, DisPurE RESO-
LUIMON AND LAWYERS 297 (1987) (declaring that in addition to providing speed and cost efficien-
cy, arbitration has the advantages of informality, privacy, and the opportunity to utilize a more
neutral decisionmaker).
124. 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).
125. E/ahi, 87 F.3d at 601-02.
126. The E/ahi court also relied upon AT&T Tech. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 649 (1986), the Court stated that "[uinless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not
the arbitrator." Elahi, 87 F.3d at 595.
127. E/ahi, 87 F.3d at 595.
128. 1l at 601 (presuming that the parties intended for an arbitrator to determine issues of
timeliness because there existed no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary).
129. 81 F.3d 1193 (2nd Cir. 1996).
130. 613 F.2d at 1222 (holding that the validity of the statute of limitation defenses are for
the arbitrator to address).
131. 944 F.2d at 114 (holding that arbitrators, and not the courts, shall assess statute of lim-
itations issues). The court adhered to the presumption that ambiguity or doubts regarding the
scope of the parties' intent to arbitrate should necessarily be resolved in favor of arbitrability. Il
at 121.
132. McGuire et al., supra note 8, at 55 (referring to Conticommodity and Wagoner as "early
decisions involv[ing) state statutes of limitations, rather than the six-year eligibility period").
133. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1199-1201 (discussing the fact that the NASD Code was not incorpo-
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through an analysis of the contract language,"3 the Bybyk court applied the
First Options standard, holding that section 15 of the NASD Code presented
clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to have an arbitrator
determine arbitrability.' 3' Moreover, the court stated that section 35 of the
NASD Code provided further proof that the parties intended to commit all
issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator."3
CONCLUSION
Although the Tenth Circuit aligned itself with the majority of other cir-
cuits in the two securities arbitration cases it heard during the Survey period,
the court's decisions represent a profound and contentious posture. In Armijo,
the court adopted and enhanced emerging trends in the securities industry by
expanding the scope of claims subject to mandatory arbitration. In Cogswell,
the court reversed the traditional presumption of arbitrability by establishing a
statute of limitations for arbitration, and thus narrowing the breadth of author-
ity vested in arbitrators.
In short, the Tenth Circuit's decisions in Armijo and Cogswell set forth a
double standard of mandatory arbitration enforcement in the securities indus-
try. Where there exists any doubt as to whether the parties intended to arbi-
trate their substantive contractual disputes, the Tenth Circuit will presump-
tively hold that arbitration must proceed. Alternatively, where there exists any
doubt as to whether the parties intended to arbitrate procedural disputes that
may preclude arbitrability, the Tenth Circuit will consider such controversies
jurisdictional prerequisites to arbitration. As a result, courts, and not arbitra-
tors, will resolve controversies concerning the timeliness of an arbitration
claim unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence to the contrary of the
parties' intent that the arbitrator would determine issues of timeliness.
Adam J. Agron
rated into the client agreement to arbitrate and, therefore, the court must look only to the client
agreement to determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate such a dispute).
134. Id. at 1199-1200. The Bybyk court concluded that the NASD Code had not been effec-
tively incorporated into the parties' client agreement. Id. at 1201. Nonetheless, the court held that
even if the rules had been included there would have been sufficient evidence that the parties
intended to have an arbitrator decide issues of timeliness. Id. at 1202.
135. Id. at 1199-1200. The court referred primarily to the following language of the agree-
ment: "[A]ny and all controversies... concerning any account, transaction, dispute or the con-
struction, performance, or breach of this or any other agreement ... shall be determined by arbi-
tration ... ." Id. at 1199 (quoting the arbitration agreement between Bybyk and PaineWebber)
(emphasis added).
136. Id. at 1202.
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